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Few ideas are as inexorable as the arrow of causation: causes must precede their effects. Explicit or
implicit knowledge about this causal order permits humans and other animals to predict and control
events in order to produce desired outcomes. The sense of agency is deeply linked with representation
of causation, since it involves the experience of a self-capable of acting on the world. Since causes must
precede effects, the perceived temporal order of our actions and subsequent events should be relevant to
the sense of agency. The present study investigated whether the ability to predict the outcome of an
action would impose the classical cause-precedes-outcome pattern on temporal order judgements.
Participants indicated whether a visual stimulus (dots moving upward or downward) was presented
either before or after voluntary actions of the left or right hand. Crucially, the dot motion could be either
congruent or incongruent with an operant association between hand and motion direction learned in a
previous learning phase. When the visual outcome of voluntary action was congruent with previous
learning, the motion onset was more often perceived as occurring after the action, compared to when
the outcome was incongruent. This suggests that the prediction of specific sensory outcomes restructures
our perception of timing of action and sensory events, inducing the experience that congruent effects
occur after participants’ actions. Interestingly, this bias to perceive events according to the temporal
order of cause and outcome disappeared when participants knew that motion directions were automat-
ically generated by the computer. This suggests that the reorganisation of time perception imposed by
associative learning depends on participants’ causal beliefs.
 2015 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. This is anopenaccess article under the CCBY license (http://
creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).1. Introduction
The detection of causal relations is essential for our survival.
Representing the causal structure of the world permits us to
predict events and produce desired outcomes. Furthermore,
individuals construct the sense of themselves as a distinct entity
in the world through the experience of their own agency
(Gallagher, 2000; Haggard & Tsakiris, 2009).
Several studies have shown that the perception of causality in
general, and agency in particular, are intimately connected to time
perception, and influence one another (Buehner & Humphreys,
2009; Desantis, Roussel, & Waszak, 2011; Eagleman & Holcombe,
2002; Faro, Leclerc, & Hastie, 2005; Shanks, Pearson, & Dickinson,
1989; Young, 1995). For instance, outcomes are perceived to occur
earlier in time when people believe that they are self-generated,compared to when they erroneously believe they are generated
by another agent (Desantis et al., 2011; Haering & Kiesel, 2012).
In addition, causal relationships are not directly perceived
(Hume, 1920; Michotte, 1963) but inferred from the temporal rela-
tionships between action and subsequent outcome (Shanks et al.,
1989). For instance, temporally contiguous outcomes are more
likely to be perceived as generated by our actions (Farrer,
Valentin, & Hupé, 2013; Wegner & Wheatley, 1999; Young,
1995). Moreover, the temporal order of our actions and other
events is highly relevant to our understanding of agency and
causality (Hume, 1920): whether an event is perceived as following
or preceding our action can influence perception of agency,
because causes must precede outcomes.
Recent studies have shown that the perception of the order of
an action and an ensuing outcome is modulated by temporal
expectancy. In particular, the brain ‘recalibrates’ predictable
delays. For example, if a sensory event reliably occurs at a pre-
dictable delay following an action, but then unexpectedly occurs
after a somewhat shorter delay, it may be misperceived as actually
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Eagleman, 2006). This important finding suggests that the nervous
system forms expectations about the temporal relationship
between actions and sensory inputs which, in turn, are used to
determine agency and causality.
However, the processing of perceptual outcomes is not only
influenced by when a perceptual consequence is expected to occur.
The nervous system also forms predictions about which specific
sensory event will occur (Friston, 2005). For instance, it has been
shown that predicted sensory outcomes are perceived as less
intense compared to unpredicted and externally generated stimuli
(Bays, Wolpert, & Flanagan, 2005; Blakemore, Goodbody, &
Wolpert, 1998; Cardoso-Leite, Mamassian, Schütz-Bosbach, &
Waszak, 2010; Hughes, Desantis, & Waszak, 2013; Tsakiris &
Haggard, 2003).
However, the relation between predicting what will happen
(i.e., outcome prediction), and the experience of when it happens
remains unclear. Previous studies suggest that predicting the
specific outcome of an action does not alter the intentional binding
phenomenon (Desantis, Hughes, & Waszak, 2012; Haering & Kiesel,
2014; see also Haggard, Poonian, & Walsh, 2009): the perceptual
latency of an event seems independent of whether that specific
event could be predicted from the specific action that was made.
However, these studies did not investigate whether or not the
prediction of a specific outcome restructures the temporal order
of action and outcome. This issue is of importance, as an effect of
this kind would imply a strong link between outcome prediction
and agency. Indeed, the ability to predict what will happen as a
result of one’s action appears to be an important starting point
for agency. For example, match or mismatch between predicted
and actual sensory events might lead the system to label sensory
events as self or externally generated, respectively (e.g.,
Blakemore, Wolpert, & Frith, 2002; Frith, 2005; Sato & Yasuda,
2005; Wolpert, 1997). Interestingly, recent studies showed that
predicted sensory outcomes are represented by the brain during
motor preparatory processes (e.g., Desantis, Roussel, & Waszak,
2014; Ziessler & Nattkemper, 2011), thus before action execution.
From these two pieces of information we hypothesised that when
a specific event is expected to appear as a consequence of a specific
action, even though it is presented before that action, it would be
experienced as occurring after it, thus creating an illusion of
agency for predicted outcomes.
The present study includes three experiments investigating this
issue. In all three experiments participants completed a temporal
order judgment task. They indicated whether a visual stimulus
(downward or upward dot motion) was presented either before
or after a voluntary key-press (Desantis et al., 2014). To investigate
the influence of the prediction of sensory outcome on time percep-
tion we varied the match/mismatch between predicted and actual
sensory outcomes (for similar methods see Hughes et al., 2013;
Roussel, Hughes, & Waszak, 2013). Notably, visual stimuli could
be congruent or incongruent with the action–outcome relation
established in a previous operant learning phase.
In Experiment 1 the temporal order judgement task was
couched in a causal judgment framework. Notably, we explicitly
instructed participants that either the computer could trigger the
visual motion, or their action could do so, depending on the timing
of occurrence. In Experiment 2 we eliminated the explicit instruc-
tions of agency of Experiment 1. In Experiment 2, participants were
simply required to indicate whether the dots moved before or after
their action, while no explicit information about precedence or
causation was provided.
Regarding Experiments 1 and 2, we hypothesised that learning
the relationship between an action and its outcome would impose
a reorganised causal structure on these events. In particular, oper-
ant learning should lead to the familiar cause-precedes-outcomerelation. Thus, learning that a specific action predicts a specific
outcome should produce a bias to perceive that specific outcome
as occurring after an action, rather than before.
Experiment 3 aimed at assessing whether the influence of
action–outcome learning on time perception is modulated by the
causal context in which participants perform the temporal
judgment task. In Experiments 1 and 2, dot motion was indeed
contingent upon the participant’s action, at least in some trials.
However, in the temporal judgment task of Experiment 3,
participants were explicitly told that dot motion was always
independent of their action. Previous studies showed that causal
context and causal belief are strong modulators of the perception
of time of action and sensory outcome (Desantis et al., 2011;
Moore, Lagnado, Deal, & Haggard, 2009). For instance, outcomes
are perceived to occur earlier in time when people believe that
they are self-generated, compared to when they erroneously
believe they are generated by another agent (Desantis et al.,
2011; Haering & Kiesel, 2012). Desantis et al. suggested that
people’s prior causal belief affects predictive mechanisms, for
example, by determining how reliable the cognitive system consid-
ers predictive signals to be or whether or not a predictive signal is
computed in the first place. Accordingly, we hypothesised that the
modulating effects of action–outcome learning on time perception
might be reduced or erased when participants knew that they did
not generate any dot motion in the test phase.2. Experiment 1
2.1. Method
2.1.1. Participants
14 Participants (9 females; M = 23.5, SD = 4.13) participated in
the experiment for a payment of £ 7.5/h. All had normal or
corrected-to-normal vision and hearing and were naïve as to the
hypothesis under investigation. They all gave written informed
consent.2.1.2. Stimuli
The stimuli were presented on a DELL LCD monitor (60 Hz
refresh rate) set at about 55 cm from participants’ eyes. Stimulus
presentation and response recording were controlled in MATLAB
using the Psychophysics Toolbox (Brainard, 1997; Pelli, 1997).
Stimuli were Random-Dot-Kinematograms (RDKs): a sequence of
random dots that appeared within a 7 deg diameter circular aper-
ture centred around fixation (a blue dot of size 0.169 deg). The
black and white dots (size 0.113 deg), were presented on a grey
(22 cd/m2) background with a density of 14.3 dots/deg2/s. Dots
moved randomly in one of all possible directions with a speed
of 1 deg/s (0.0167 deg/frame). However, after participants’
key-presses (in the learning phases; see below) or on a random
basis, before or after participants’ key-presses (in the test phases;
see below) all dots moved coherently upward or downward. Dur-
ing this coherent motion, on each video frame the dots were
shifted 0.0668 deg either upward or downward. This corresponds
to a speed of 4 deg/s. Each dot had a life time of 8 frames. There-
after, it disappeared and immediately reappeared in a new location
within the circular aperture.2.2. Procedure
Participants completed 40 blocks, each consisting of an
association phase and a test phase.
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The aim of the association phase was to make participants learn
action–outcome associations. Participants viewed an ongoing RDK.
They were required to execute left or right index finger key-presses
at a time of their own choosing, but at intervals of at least 330 ms,
with random yet approximately equiprobable choice between the
two alternatives. Feedback on the proportion of right and left
key-presses was provided every 10 trials. Each key-press immedi-
ately triggered a 100% coherent dot motion. For half of the partic-
ipants, left key-presses moved the dots upward and the right
downward. For the rest of the participants the reverse mapping
was used. Coherent motion was presented for 3 video frames
(about 50 ms) beginning with the key-press, and random motion
then returned. To ensure that participants were paying attention
to the dot motion and that they learned the action–outcome map-
ping, in 15% of the trials their key-presses triggered an incongruent
dot motion, i.e., the motion that was associated with the other
hand (Fig. 1). Participants were asked to report detection of the
incongruent events by pressing both keys as fast as possible. The
association phase consisted of 40 trials in the first block, and 20
trials thereafter.2.2.2. Test phase
After each association phase, participants completed a short
test phase which assessed the influence of action–outcome learn-
ing on the perception of temporal order of action and sensory
event. Participants were asked to execute left/right actions at about
500 ms after a go signal (a 700 Hz sinusoidal tone, 50 ms of
duration, presented at 69 dB). Participants again chose randomly
and approximately equiprobably, and were given summary
feedback of their choices after every five trials. Only those trials
in which participants performed an action within 350 ms and
800 ms after the go signal were considered as ‘‘correct” trials.
Faster or slower responses were replaced with new trials. Crucially,
however, the timing of action and outcome were now randomly
varied, so that we could test the perceived temporal order of action
and visual motion. Notably, 100% coherent upward or downward
motion was delivered at one of ten different latencies 133,
100, 66, 50, 33, 33, 50, 66, 100 or 133 ms relative to the
mean action latency on all previous test phases. Negative SOAs
indicate that the dot motion was presented before the mean action
time and positive SOAs indicate that the dot motion was presented
after the mean action time. For the first block, mean action times
were calculated in a short training session where participants
were simply asked to execute key-presses within a time window
of 350–800 ms after a go signal.
Crucially, dot motion direction was random. That is, it randomly
did or did not respect the action–outcome congruency participants330 5050
Congruent Congruen
Fig. 1. Illustration of the acquisition phase. Participants executed randomly and about eq
key-press triggered a 100% coherent dot motion. Coherent motion was presented for 50
next key-press was executed. Occasional ‘catch’ trials produced an incongruent motion d
key press.had learned in the previous acquisition phases. Thus, any outcomes
of congruency in the test phase would be results of previous learn-
ing during the acquisition phase about the mapping between
specific actions and specific motion directions. Coherent dot
motion was presented for 50 ms. Thereafter, the dots moved ran-
domly for 433 ms and disappeared. Participants then indicated
whether the dots moved coherently ‘‘before” or ‘‘after” their key-
press. In order to ensure that participants understood the relation
between causation and temporal order, participants were explicitly
told that this task was equivalent to indicating whether the dot
motion was triggered by the computer (‘‘before”) or by the partic-
ipant (‘‘after”). They registered their judgement on each trial in a
way designed to avoid lateralised responding. Participants were
asked to press the space bar to make the two options ‘‘before (com-
puter)” and ‘‘after (you)” alternate on the screen. Then, participants
had to press both left and right keys together to select one of the
two options (Fig. 2). This procedure was used to avoid possible bias
from a one-handed response being used both to report the decision
and to trigger the next trial. Importantly, participants were explic-
itly told that the direction of the motion was irrelevant for the tem-
poral order task.
Note that for all except for the two longer positive SOAs (i.e.,
+100 and +133) the dot motion was automatically triggered by
the computer. The dot motion scheduled at 100 ms and 133 ms
after participants’ mean action time was presented only if partici-
pants actually executed a key-press before the scheduled dot onset
time. That is, if in a trial n the dot motion was scheduled to be pre-
sented 633 ms after the go signal (i.e., 500 ms [mean action time]
+ 133 ms [SOA]), dot motion was presented only if the participant
executed a key press at time t < 633 ms. If this delay passed with-
out any key-press, the trial stopped and no dot motion was pre-
sented. This was meant to maintain the participants’ belief that
in some trials key-presses were causally related to the presentation
of the stimulus.
To make sure that participants encoded the direction of the dots
in 15% of the trials, in addition to the TOJ task, participants were
required to indicate the direction of the coherent motion. To indi-
cate their response participants pressed either the left (letter A) or
the right key (letter L). To be more precise, according to the action–
outcome mapping for half of the participants the left key indicated
upward motion and the right key downward motion. For the other
half the reversed mapping was used. For instance, if in the associ-
ation phase a left key-press (letter A) triggered an upward motion,
in the test phase the same key-press indicated the upward motion
response in the catch trials. We thought that this would be an easy
way to indicate the motion direction participants perceived, and it
would also reinforce action–outcome mappings. In addition, at the
end of the experiment participants were asked whether they had
the impression of generating ‘‘more”, ‘‘less” or ‘‘roughly an equal”330
Time
 (ms)50
t Incongruent
Catch trial
ually often left or right index finger key-presses, at intervals of at least 330 ms. Each
ms immediately after the key-press. Thereafter the dots moved randomly until the
irection. Participants were required to respond to this event with a rapid bimanual
(b)
(a)
Congruent motion
Incongruent motion
Mean
action time (ms)
-133 -100 -66 -50 -33 33 50 66 100* 133*
550
{500 (mean action time) + 50 SOA
Motion 433 Space
bar
before
computer
Time (ms)
Fig. 2. (a) Illustration of the factorial design. Participants executed a left/right key-press in a time window of 350–800 ms after a pure tone. They were randomly presented
with congruent or incongruent trials in which the action–outcome association they learnt in the association phase was respected or violated, respectively. Congruent/
incongruent motion was delivered at one of ten different latencies 133, 100, 66, 50, 33, 33, 50, 66, 100 or 133 ms relative to the mean action latency on all previous
test phases. (b) Illustration of a test phase trial. Participants executed a left/right action after the presentation of a sound. The onset of the dot motion was determined by
adding/subtracting one of the SOA (i.e., +50 ms SOA) to/from the mean action latency calculated on all previous test phases (i.e., 500 ms [mean action time] + 50 ms (SOA)
= 550 ms dot motion onset). Participants were required to indicate whether the coherent dot motion was presented before or after their key-press.
A. Desantis et al. / Cognition 146 (2016) 100–109 103amount of coherent dots motion compared to those generated by
the computer.
Each test phase consisted of 10 trials (400 test trials in total).
Each SOA was presented 20 times (200 trials in total) multiplied
by 2 congruency conditions.2.3. Data analyses
Because stimuli were delivered on the basis of estimated action
time, we calculated the actual action–motion interval for each trial.
Then, we divided the stimulus-before-action trials into 5 time
intervals of equal number of trials for both congruent and
incongruent trials (see Table 1 for mean and standard deviation
of number of trials for each bin). We applied the same procedure
to the stimulus-after-action trials (see Table 2 for mean and
standard deviation of time intervals for each bin).
The proportion of ‘‘dot motion after” responses was then
calculated separately for each participant, each congruency condi-
tion and each time interval. Psychometric Functions (cumulative
Gaussians) were fitted using the Palamedes Toolbox for MatlabTable 1
Mean (SD) number of trials for each of the ten resampled bins in Experiments 1, 2 and 3.
Conditions Bin 1 Bin 2 Bin 3 Bin 4 Bin 5
Experiment 1
Congruent 21.1(2.9) 21.1(2.9) 21.1(2.9) 21.1(2.9) 21.2(
Incongruent 21.6(3.3) 21.6(3.3) 21.6(3.3) 21.6(3.3) 21.3(
Experiment 2
Congruent 21.3(4) 21.3(4) 21.3(4) 21.3(4) 20.8(
Incongruent 21.7(2.8) 21.7(2.8) 21.7(2.8) 21.7(2.8) 22.2(
Experiment 3
Congruent 21.3(5.3) 21.3(5.3) 21.3(5.3) 21.3(5.3) 21.3(
Incongruent 20.3(5.5) 20.3(5.5) 20.3(5.5) 20.3(5.5) 20.1(which implements the maximum-likelihood method described
by Prins and Kingdom (2009; www.palamedestoolbox.org). Based
on each individual function, we calculated the Point of Subjective
Simultaneity (PSS) and the Just Noticeable Difference (JND). The
PSS reflects the time interval before/after action execution at
which the dot motion had to be presented to be perceived as
occurring simultaneously with the action. The JND, defined as half
the inter-quartile range, is a measure of the slope of the
psychometric function, and reflects participants’ sensitivity to time
discrimination. The level of significance of our analysis was set at
p < .05 for all statistical tests.2.4. Results
The results of the test phase are shown in Fig. 3. Participants
reported congruent motion to occur after their action, relative to
incongruent motion. The PSS values (congruent M = 103 ms,
SD = 54 ms; incongruent M = 82 ms, SD = 52 ms) were signifi-
cantly different t(13) = 6.29, p < .000, d = 0.396 (Fig. 3a). More-
over, single t-tests showed that both congruent (t(13) = 7.155,Bin 6 Bin 7 Bin 8 Bin 9 Bin 10
2.8) 19(3.3) 19(3.3) 19(3.3) 19(3.3) 19.1(3.7)
3.3) 18.3(2.7) 18.3(2.7) 18.3(2.7) 18.3(2.7) 18.3(2.7)
4.5) 19(3.9) 19(3.9) 19(3.9) 19(3.9) 18.6(4.5)
3) 17.9(3.2) 17.9(3.2) 17.9(3.2) 17.9(3.2) 17.9(3.2)
6.2) 19(5.4) 19(5.4) 19(5.4) 19(5.4) 19.1(6.6)
5.6) 19.4(5.3) 19.4(5.3) 19.4(5.3) 19.4(5.3) 19(3.3)
Table 2
Mean (SD) of time intervals in milliseconds for action–motion interval for each of the ten resampled bins in Experiments 1, 2 and 3. Because stimuli were delivered on the basis of
estimated action time, we calculated the actual action–motion interval for each trial.
Conditions Bin 1 Bin 2 Bin 3 Bin 4 Bin 5 Bin 6 Bin 7 Bin 8 Bin 9 Bin 10
Experiment 1
Congruent 213(33) 128(20) 85(17) 48(13) 11(5) 27(5) 57(11) 92(12) 133(15) 198(21)
Incongruent 220(30) 134(23) 87(18) 49(15) 12(6) 26(5) 56(10) 90(12) 133(17) 199(21)
Experiment 2
Congruent 225(35) 135(27) 87(20) 45(13) 10(4) 26(4) 53(9) 85(11) 126(12) 188(13)
Incongruent 219(39) 133(27) 87(23) 51(17) 12(5) 25(3) 57(8) 89(12) 130(14) 192(14)
Experiment 3
Congruent 218(44) 131(32) 84(23) 45(16) 10(5) 25(5) 57(15) 93(19) 137(26) 199(33)
Incongruent 216(39) 131(34) 82(22) 42(14) 9(6) 27(6) 62(15) 95(22) 137(31) 198(43)
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Fig. 3. Left panel: The psychometric function for one participant in Experiments 1, 2 and 3. The figures depict the proportion of ‘‘dot motion after” responses for congruent
(grey line) and incongruent stimuli (black line) as a function of the ten time intervals. Central panel: The figures depict the difference PSS (congruent) – PSS (incongruent) for
each participants in Experiments 1, 2 and 3. A negative difference indicates that congruent dot motion was perceived more often as occurring after the action compared to
incongruent dot motion. Right panel: Mean PSS value and standard errors for both congruent and incongruent trials in Experiments 1, 2 and 3.
104 A. Desantis et al. / Cognition 146 (2016) 100–109p < .000, d = 1.907) and incongruent coherent dot motions (t(13)
= 5.909, p < .000, d = 1.577) where perceived more often after the
physical onset time of actions (i.e., 0 ms, physical temporal simul-
taneity between action and coherent dot motion).
We did not observe any differences between congruent and
incongruent JND values t(13) = 1.14, p = .27. Mean r2 – as a
measure of the goodness-of-fit – for the two conditions were as
follows: congruent M = 0.874, SD = 0.076; incongruent M = 0.888,
SD = 0.077.
Three control analyses investigated whether the differences
between congruent and incongruent judgements could reflectfactors other than the match/mismatch between predicted and
actual sensory outcome. Participants were asked to press the left
and the right key equally often. Since presentation of coherent
dot motion was in some trials triggered before action execution,
participants could have been biased towards executing more con-
gruent than incongruent key-presses. In order to rule out this pos-
sibility we compared the number of congruent and incongruent
key-presses for the stimulus-before-action trials. A paired two-
tailed t-test showed no significant difference between number of
congruent (M = 105.5; SD = 14.31) vs. incongruent (M = 107.93;
SD = 16.08) trials, t(13) = 0.65, p = 0.53. Thus, participants were
A. Desantis et al. / Cognition 146 (2016) 100–109 105not biased in executing the congruent action after perceiving the
dot motion.
Furthermore, we assessed whether the difference between
congruent and incongruent trials was driven by a difference in
action time. To do so, we compared action time for congruent
(M = 525 ms, SD = 45 ms) vs. incongruent (M = 530 ms, SD = 48 ms)
trials. A paired two-tailed t-test did not show any difference
between action times t(13) = 1.54, p = 0.15 confirming that action
time did not modulate the congruency effect.
To assess whether participants were attending more congruent
compared to incongruent stimuli we compared the proportion of
correct stimulus identification in the catch trials for congruent
(M = 0.91, SD = 0.09) and incongruent motion (M = 0.87,
SD = 0.10) and no significant difference was found t(13) = 1.58,
p = 0.14.
Finally, participants had the impression of generating ‘‘roughly
an equal” amount of coherent dot motion in the TOJ task compared
to the computer.
2.5. Preliminary discussion
Experiment 1 shows that congruent sensory events were
perceived more often as occurring after action execution. This
suggests that the match or mismatch between predicted and actual
outcome can restructure the perceived time of occurrence of
action and outcome. The causal association between specific
actions and specific sensory events established in the acquisition
phase subsequently shapes participants’ perception of temporal
order of action and sensory events. That is, the perception of time
was constrained by learning specific action–outcome relations.
However, the temporal order judgement task was couched in a
causal judgment framework, because we explicitly instructed
participants that either the computer could trigger the visual
motion, or their action could do so, depending on the timing of
occurrence. Thus, participants had causal information about
action–outcome relations from two distinct sources. First, they
implicitly acquired causal information about the relation between
particular action identities and particular motion directions during
the acquisition phase. Second, they were explicitly given causal
information about temporal precedence between action and visual
motion during the instructions, but this information made no ref-
erence to congruence of identity relations. Our modulation of PSS
by congruence suggested that the acquired causal relation between
action and motion identities influenced time perception. However,
we cannot exclude the possibility that participants might link
action–outcome congruence to time perception because our
instructions explicitly drew attention to the temporal precedence
aspects of causation. To investigate this issue, we ran a second
experiment in which participants were simply required to indicate
whether the dots moved before or after their action, while no
explicit information about precedence or causation was provided.3. Experiment 2
3.1. Methods
3.1.1. Participants
14 Participants (7 females; M = 22.14, SD = 2.60) participated in
the experiment and received payment of £ 7.5/h. All had normal or
corrected-to-normal vision and hearing and were naïve as to the
hypothesis under investigation. They all gave written informed
consent.
3.1.2. Association phase
Same as in Experiment 1.3.1.3. Test phase
The test phase was identical to Experiment 1, except that in
Experiment 2 no instruction was given linking the judgment
‘‘before” and ‘‘after” and the causal attribution ‘‘computer” and
‘‘self” was provided. Participants were simply asked to indicate
whether the dots moved before or after their key-press. They were
instructed that dot motion direction was irrelevant to the task.
3.2. Results
The results are shown in Fig. 3. Participants reported congruent
motion to occur after their action, relative to incongruent motion.
PSS values comparing congruent (M = 47 ms, SD = 37 ms) and
incongruent (M = 37 ms, SD = 37 ms) trials showed a significant
difference t(13) = 2.81, p = .015, d = 0.27. Single t-tests showed
that both congruent (t(13) = 4.79, p < .000, d = 1.27) and incongru-
ent coherent dot motions (t(13) = 3.75, p = .002, d = 1) where
perceived more often after the physical onset time of actions.
We did not observe any differences between congruent and
incongruent JND values t(13) = 1.39, p = 0.19. Mean r2 – as a
measure of the goodness-of-fit – for the two conditions were as
follows: congruent M = 0.861, SD = 0.088; incongruent M = 0.893,
SD = 0.089.
We performed the same three control analyses as in Experiment
1, to investigate whether the differences between congruent and
incongruent judgements could reflect factors other than the
match/mismatch between predicted and actual sensory outcome.
In order to rule out the possibility that in the stimulus-before-
action trials dot motion biased participants in executing congruent
key-presses we compared the number of congruent vs. incongru-
ent stimulus-before-action trials. Two-tailed t-test showed no
significant difference between number of congruent (M = 106.21,
SD = 20.58) vs. incongruent (M = 109.07, SD = 14.04) trials, t(13)
= 0.85, p = 0.41. Thus, participants did not execute more often
congruent actions.
To assess whether the difference between congruent and
incongruent trials was not driven by a difference in action time,
we compared action time for congruent (M = 494 ms, SD = 30 ms)
vs. incongruent (M = 492 ms, SD = 30 ms) trials. A paired two tailed
t-test showed no difference between reaction times, t(13) = 1.06,
p = 0.30.
To assess whether participants were attending more congruent
compared to incongruent stimuli we compared performances to
catch trials for congruent (M = 0.92, SD = 0.08) and incongruent
(M = 0.92, SD = 0.05) motion, t(13) = 1.33, p = 0.89. Finally,
participants had the impression of generating ‘‘roughly an equal”
amount of dot motion in the test phase.
3.3. Preliminary discussion
Experiment 2 appeared to participants as a ‘pure’ TOJ task,
without the causal judgement framework given in Experiment 1.
We nevertheless replicated the findings we observed in Experi-
ment 1. Explicit instructions regarding temporal precedence in
Experiment 1 did contribute significantly to congruence effects
on time perception. However, and crucially, the acquired causal
link between action and outcome identity significantly affected
time perception even when the experimental framework made
no reference to the temporal precedence aspects of causation.
Taken together these results suggest that causal relation
between action and outcome during the association phase creates
a perceptual bias in the test phase, so that visual stimuli congruent
with the acquired operant agency relation are perceived as occur-
ring later than comparable stimuli that do not share the agency
relation. The modulating effect of action–outcome learning on time
perception can best be understood in terms of predictive processes.
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sensory events led participants to perceive dot motion after/before
action execution respectively (see Section 5).
Experiment 3 aimed at investigating whether the congruence
effect depends on participants’ causal beliefs about the relation
between actions and sensory events. Previous studies have shown
that the belief of being or not the cause of a sensory event modu-
lates the intentional binding phenomenon. Desantis et al. (2011),
for example, showed that the shift in the perceived time of the sen-
sory outcome was abolished when participants were led to believe
erroneously that the outcome was not caused by them but by
another agent. Moreover, Moore et al. (2009) asked participants
to make key-press actions to cause a tone. In an experimental
block, the same tone frequently occurred anyway, even in the
absence of actions, while in a control block it did not. Thus, the
contingency of the tone on the action, which is widely taken as a
cue for causation and agency (Dickinson & Balleine, 2000) was
lower in the experimental block. The lower contingency in the
experimental block lead to a reduction in action binding (a per-
ceived shift in time of the action towards the consequent tone;
Haggard, Clark, & Kalogeras, 2002). Taken together these studies
suggest that the causal context is a strong modulators of the per-
ception of time of action and sensory outcome. People presumably
learn whether their actions cause particular sensory events,
leading to changes in temporal experience.
In the temporal order judgment task of experiments 1 and 2
participants’ experienced that in some trials they were generating
the dot motion presentation. In Experiment 1 this experience
partly depended on our instructions. However, in Experiment 2,
in which no explicit information about causation was provided,
this impression of causality must have been inferred from the tem-
poral precedence of action with respect to the dot motion; an infer-
ence that was corroborated by the small number of trials in which
the action actually triggered the onset of directional visual motion
(i.e., the +100 and +133 ms see Section 2.2.2 of Experiment 1).
Indeed, if participants failed to respond within the designated time
window, no visual motion was presented (those trials represented
2.7% of the total number of trials). This sensory evidence presum-
ably lead them to correctly believe that their actions do cause the
visual motion stimulus in some trials.
In Experiment 3 we investigated the importance of the causal
context in the congruence effect we observed, by making two
key changes to the experimental design. First, participants were
now explicitly told that dot motion was automatically generated
by the computer. Second, we removed all trials in which stimulus
presentation was contingent to action execution, replacing them
with trials at similar latency with respect to the action, but trig-
gered by the computer based on an estimate of the participant’s
action time. If our effects on time perception are due to partici-
pants’ understanding of the causal structure of temporal order
judgment task then these changes should abolish/significantly
reduce congruence effects on TOJ.4. Experiment 3
4.1. Method
4.1.1. Participants
14 Participants (9 females; M = 24.07, SD = 4.18) participated in
the experiment for a payment of £ 7.5/h. All had normal or
corrected-to-normal vision and hearing and were naïve as to the
hypothesis under investigation. They all gave written informed
consent.4.1.2. Acquisition phase
See Experiments 1 and 2.
4.1.3. Test phase
In Experiment 3, participants were told that coherent dot
motion was automatically generated by the computer. Thus,
participants’ key-presses never generated coherent dot motion.
Whereas +100 and +133 ms trials in Experiments 1 and 2 were
directly triggered from the participants’ key-press, the equivalent
trials in Experiment 3 were, like all the other trials, generated
based on the expected mean action latency, with no reference to
current action.
4.2. Data analyses
See above.
4.3. Results
A paired two tailed t-test on PSS values comparing congruent
(M = 63 ms; SD = 42 ms) and incongruent trials (M = 68 ms;
SD = 43 ms) did not show any significant effect t(13) = 1.33,
p = .21. However, single t-tests showed that both congruent
(t(13) = 5.63, p < .000, d = 1.5) and incongruent coherent dot
motions (t(13) = 5.91, p < .000, d = 1.58) where perceived more
often after the physical onset time of action execution (i.e., 0 ms,
physical temporal simultaneity between action and coherent dot
motion).
We did not observe any differences between congruent and
incongruent JND values t(13) = 0.55, p = .59. Mean r2 – as a
measure of the goodness-of-fit – for the two conditions were as
follows: congruent M = 0.816, SD = 0.118; incongruent M = 0.815,
SD = 0.124.
We performed the same three control analyses as before, for
consistency with the previous experiments. In order to rule out
the possibility that in the stimulus-before-action trials dot
motion biased participants in executing congruent key-presses
we compared the number of congruent vs. incongruent stimulus-
before-action trials. Two-tailed t-test showed no significant
difference between number of congruent (M = 105.5, SD = 14.31)
vs. incongruent trials (M = 107.93, SD = 16.08), t(13) = 1.40,
p = 0.18. Thus, participants did not execute more often congruent
than incongruent actions.
We compared action time for congruent (M = 508 ms,
SD = 41 ms) vs. incongruent trials (M = 506 ms, SD = 41 ms), a
paired two tailed t-test showed no difference between reaction
times t(13) = 1.57, p = 0.14.
To make sure that participants encoded equally congruent and
incongruent dot motion in the test phase, we compared perfor-
mances to catch trials in the test phase for congruent (M = 0.88,
SD = 0.11) and incongruent motion (M = 0.89, SD = 0.11). No differ-
ence was observed t(13) = 0.40, p = 0.70.
In addition, we conducted a between-experiment mixed
ANOVA on PSS with Experiment (Experiments 1, 2, and 3) as a
between-subjects factor and Congruency (congruent, incongruent)
as a within-subjects factor. There was a significant interaction
between Experiment and Congruency F(2,39) = 13.863, p < .000,
g2p ¼ 0:415. The interaction effect was driven by a significant differ-
ence in the congruence effect observed in the three experiments i.
e., the presence of a congruency effect in Experiments 1 and 2 and
the absence of one in Experiment 3 (see also results of experiments
1 and 2). The analyses reported also a main effect of Experiment F
(2,39) = 4.574, p = .016, g2p ¼ 0:19. Independent samples t-tests
showed that visual motion stimuli were more often perceived after
action execution in Experiment 1 compared to Experiment 2
(p = .007, d = 1.113), no difference was observed between Experi-
ments 1 and 3 (p = .140), and between Experiments 2 and 3
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(1,39) = 18.520, p < .000, g2p ¼ 0:322, with congruent dot motion
being perceived more often after participants action than
incongruent dot motion.
The same ANOVA was conducted on JND values. The analyses
showed no significant interaction F(2,39) = .050, p = .951,
g2p ¼ 0:002. No main effect of congruency was observed F(1,39)
= 2.634, p = .113, g2p ¼ 0:063. We observed a main effect of
Experiment F(2,39) = 4.061, p = .025, g2p ¼ 0:172. Higher JND values
were observed in Experiment 3 compared to experiment 2
(p = .048, d = 0.782), and to experiment 1 (p = .031, d = 1.08).
This suggests that temporal discrimination was reduced in
Experiment 3 compared to the other experiments. This might
indicate that the temporal order judgment task was harder for
the participants of Experiment 3.
There is the possibility that the congruence effect on PSS values
we observed in Experiments 1 and 2 compared to Experiment 3 is
driven by the fact that participants did not learn action–outcome
associations in Experiment 3. In order to assess this issue we
conducted a one-way ANOVA on the proportion of correct
detection of incongruent dot motion in the learning phase with
Experiment (one, two, and three) as factor. The ANOVA showed
no difference of detection performances between Experiments F
(2,39) = .666, p = .519, g2p ¼ 0:033, indicating that action–outcome
associations were learnt with the same strength in the 3
experiments: proportion of correct detection performances in the
learning phases were as follow: Experiment 1: M = 0.72,
SD = 0.13; Experiment 2: M = 0.78, SD = 0.10; Experiment 3:
M = 0.74, SD = 0.20.5. General discussion
The present study investigated the relations between the
prediction of sensory outcome, causal beliefs and the perceived
temporal order of action and their outcomes. Participants were
required to indicate whether dots moved upward or downward
before or after their key-presses. Coherent dot motion was either
congruent or incongruent with respect to the action that partici-
pants executed in a given trial. In congruent trials participants’
key-press was preceded (or followed) by the dot motion direction
that was associated with that same key-press in the learning
phase. In incongruent trials their action was preceded (or followed)
by the dot motion direction associated with the other hand.
The results of our study could be summarised as follows. Firstly,
we observed that congruent sensory events were perceived more
often as occurring after participants’ actions. Secondly, the congru-
ency effect was observed only when participants believed that they
caused the outcome. In particular, the presence of some trials in
which actions contingently triggered the dot motion appeared to
be important in sustaining this belief. Finally, in all three
experiments, both congruent and incongruent dot motions were
perceived more often after the physical onset time of participants’
actions.
Recent studies suggest that predicted sensory outcomes are
represented by the brain during motor preparatory processes
(e.g., Desantis et al., 2014; Ziessler & Nattkemper, 2011).
Accordingly, we think that the congruence effect we observed in
Experiments 1 and 2 can be partly understood in terms of
predictive processes. Notably, the prediction of the outcome gener-
ated by an action would be available before participants execute
their key-press. A match between the predicted and actual sensory
event (i.e., congruent dot motions) led participants to perceive dot
motion more often after action execution compared to incongruent
dot motions, respectively.Several explanations could be relevant to understand this
effect. Salient stimuli strongly attract our attention (Kerzel &
Schönhammer, 2013). Thus, unexpected events might be perceived
to occur earlier than expected events, perhaps because of their
high attentional salience. However, this explanation is controver-
sial since two recent studies investigating the influence of outcome
prediction on the intentional binding failed to find the difference
between perceived onset time of congruent and incongruent out-
comes (Desantis, Hughes, et al., 2012; Haering & Kiesel, 2014).
An alternative explanation of our findings would be in terms of
motor preparatory processes. Studies show that participants’
awareness of movement initiation consistently anticipates the
actual starting time of the movement (Libet, Gleason, Wright, &
Pearl, 1983; McCloskey, Colebatch, Potter, & Burke, 1983). More-
over, these judgments are linked to lateralised readiness potentials
(LRP; see Blakemore et al., 2002; Haggard & Eimer, 1999), which
are thought to reflect lateralised action-specific activation in M1
(Coles, 1989; Leuthold & Jentzsch, 2002). Accordingly, awareness
of initiating an action relates to preparing a specific movement
(Haggard & Eimer, 1999).
Interestingly, recent studies have shown that predicted out-
comes presented before movement execution modulates motor
preparatory activity and in particular LRP (Nikolaev, Ziessler,
Dimova, & van Leeuwen, 2008). For instance, in an EEG study,
Nikolaev et al. (2008) showed that unpredicted (incongruent) out-
comes result in extended motor processing compared to predicted
outcomes. This suggests that congruency modulates the motor
preparatory processes on which participant’s awareness of initiat-
ing an action is based. Accordingly, in our study, participants
would report their action as occurring earlier in congruent trials
compared to incongruent trials. However, only the concurrent
assessment of motor preparatory processes and temporal discrim-
ination of action and outcome can settle this issue conclusively.
Importantly, note that the congruence effect was observed only
when participants’ had clear evidence that their actions were
indeed causally linked to the occurrence of the dot motion, at least
on some of the trials (Experiments 1 and 2). In fact, the effect was
abolished when participants knew that dot motion in the TOJ task
was always triggered by the computer (Experiment 3). This
suggests that the influence of the prediction of sensory outcome
on the temporal order of action and outcome is conditional to
participants’ understanding of their causal effectiveness. Notably,
prediction influenced performances only when action–outcome
contingency was preserved. Causal context might determine how
reliable the sensorimotor system considers internal predictions
to be. Specifically, depending on whether or not the agent believes
to be the cause of an upcoming event, predictive signals might get
high or low weights and accordingly have a larger/smaller influ-
ence on the processes underlying time perception. Notably, when
participants believed that they themselves generated the dot
motions, the weight attributed to the predicted outcomes would
be higher compared to when they believed that stimuli were trig-
gered by the computer. This might result in stronger expectation
for congruent events in the agency vs. the non-agency experi-
ments. Consequently, a mismatch between predicted and actual
outcome would have led to higher conflict in the case in which
participants believed of generating the dot motion (for similar
account see Desantis, Weiss, Schütz-Bosbach, & Waszak, 2012;
Desantis et al., 2011; Moore & Fletcher, 2012; Synofzik, Vosgerau,
& Newen, 2008). Thus, the effect of outcome prediction is strongly
conditional to people’s understanding of the causal context in
which their actions are performed. Indeed, participants’ beliefs of
causality can strongly magnify (Experiment 1) or abolished
entirely (Experiment 3) the congruence effect.
These results provide further evidence relative to the relation-
ship between time perception and agency (cf. Farrer et al., 2013;
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specific action and a specific sensory outcome leads to a change
in time perception, by imposing the usual temporal order of causes
preceding outcomes. Crucially, these effects significantly depend
both on experience of action–outcome contingency, and on beliefs
or instructions about the causal arrangement of the task. This
suggests a hierarchical organisation, in which contingency/
causality provides the key information for time perception. The
ability to predict a specific sensory event based on a learned
action–outcome mapping has a further effect, but only if contin-
gency is present.
Finally, across all experiments participants perceived both con-
gruent and incongruent stimuli more often after their actions even
though they were physically presented before action execution
(i.e., on average a coherent dot motion presented 67 ms before
the action was perceived as occurring simultaneously with the
action). This might be explained by the fact participants
estimate the time of actions partly from efferent signals linked to
motor preparation (Haggard & Eimer, 1999; Obhi, Planetta, &
Scantlebury, 2009; Strother & Obhi, 2009) rather than from sensory
feedbacks arising from the movement itself. In our study this led
participants perceive dot motions more often after action
execution even though they were presented physically before
participants’ movement. In agency and voluntary action, this
observation seems to be particularly important as perceiving
plausible sensory events as occurring after a movement even
though they are presented before action execution might erro-
neously lead to a self-attribution of these events. Thus, disturbance
in efferent signals might sensibly alter the perceived temporal
order between actions and plausible sensory events, ultimately
leading to over/under-attribution of agency, in a manner reminis-
cent of delusions of control.
To conclude, there is accumulating evidence showing that
action strongly influences perception (Blakemore et al., 1998;
Roussel et al., 2013; Zwickel, Grosjean, & Prinz, 2007). These
studies suggest that motor processes mediate the transformation
of physical stimulation into perceptual experience (Wilson &
Knoblich, 2005). Here, we show that a learned association between
specific actions and specific outcomes can modify the temporal
structure of time of action and outcome: predicted outcomes are
perceived more often as occurring after participants’ actions.
However, this is observed only when contextual factors such as
the causal context, instructions, and belief frameworks are
provided (Buehner & Humphreys, 2009; Desantis et al., 2011;
Moore et al., 2009). Thus, participants acquire causal knowledge
both implicitly from sensory events, and more contextually or
more explicitly, through other means. Temporal perception could
emerge from the weighted combination of these different kinds
of information. The end result would be a coherent representation
of the causal structure of the world, in which the directionalities of
time and of causation are mentally linked.
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